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COURT REPORTS

was "merely speculative" that any judicial review and decision on the
matter would redress the injury to the Department.
IThe court reasoned that the Department's concern that further fish
entrainment studies might be required was valid; however, the "reopener"
clauses in the licenses provided for just such a concern. The court
reasoned that should it become necessary, under the "reopener" clauses,
FERC could impose additional requirements such as fish entrainment and
other alternative fish protection devices. Thus, the court concluded that
any injury to the Department from the failure to explicitly require
mandatory fish entrainment studies in the license provisions was not
redressable. The "reopener" clauses provided protection to prevent the
realization of the Department's speculative injury. The court, therefore,
dismissed the Department's challenge for lack of standing.
Lucinda K. Henriksen

NINTH CIRCUIT
B.J. Carney Indus., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency,
192 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding Carney's appeal untimely because
Carney filed it more than thirty days after the Administrative Law Judge's
order assessing a civil penalty).
B.J. Carney Industries, Inc. ("Carney") operated a wood pole treating
company.
Water from the company flowed into Sandpoint, Idaho's
publicly owned treatment works ("POTW").
The United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), pursuant to Sandpoint's
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit, required
Sandpoint to issue industrial waste acceptance ("IWA") forms to
Sandpoint's industrial POTW users like Carney.
In November 1985, the EPA wrote Carney and declared: (1) that
Carney's discharge to the Sandpoint POTW violated pretreatment standards
because the discharge contained PCP and diesel grade oil; and (2) that the
EPA would defer to Sandpoint's pretreatment standards enforcement
program. On January 9, 1987, Sandpoint issued Carney an IWA allowing
small amounts of PCP discharge. Carney contacted the EPA regarding the
EPA's conclusion that Carney's discharge violated the EPA's pretreatment
standards. Furthermore, Carney stated that Sandpoint and Carney's IWA
was more consonant with sensible environmental policy. Consequently,
the EPA reasserted that Carney's discharge to the Sandpoint POTW
violated the EPA's "no discharge standard," even though Sandpoint had
given Carney an IWA permitting such discharge. The EPA, again, stated
that it would defer to Sandpoint's enforcement authority and inform
Sandpoint of the situation. Carney's IWA allowing PCP discharge expired
May 29, 1990. Shortly thereafter, Sandpoint issued Carney an IWA
permitting no discharge of PCP. On July 16, 1990, Carney closed its plant
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and cleaned up the site.
The EPA filed a complaint seeking a civil penalty assessment for
Carney's previous years of noncompliance. The Administrative Law Judge
("AU") found that Carney had violated the pretreatment standards,
assessed a $9000 gravity-based penalty, and disallowed the EPA to recover
Carney's economic benefits from its violations.
Both the EPA and Carney appealed to the Environmental Appeals
Board ("Board"). The Board affirmed the ALJ's ruling, but remanded the
case solely for: (1) a determination regarding Carney's obtained economic
benefits amount during the limitations period; and (2) a penalty
recalculation accordingly. A different ALJ concluded on remand that the
economic benefit and gravity-based penalties sum surpassed the maximum
statutory penalty of $125,000; therefore, the ALJ assessed Carney with a
$125,000 civil penalty. The ALJ's penalty order was issued on January 5,
1998. Carney appealed the AL order seventy days later, on March 16,
1998.
The EPA moved for dismissal, arguing that the appeal was
untimely.
The EPA argued that a federal court had no jurisdiction to hear the
appeal because the statute of limitations had run. The Clean Water Act
("CWA") provided that a civil penalty assessment appeal to a federal court
of appeals had to be filed within the thirty-day period, beginning on the
date the civil penalty order was issued.
Carney maintained that the ALJ's initial decision became an appealable
order by the Board forty-five days after the AL issued the order, relying
on the Code of Federal Regulations ("CFR"). The CFR provided that a
presiding officer's initial decision became final forty-five days after service
unless an appeal was taken to the Board or the Board chose to review sua
sponte. Carney also argued that the CWA authorized only the EPA
Administrator to assess civil penalties, and the Administrator had delegated
that power to the Board, as opposed to the ALs; accordingly, the AL
lacked the authority to issue a civil penalty order under the CWA.
The court noted that the CFR expressly empowered an AL with the
authority to make an initial decision with a recommended civil penalty
assessment. The court asserted that Congress might have desired to devise
an opportunity, via the CWA, where parties could bypass the
administrative process and obtain immediate review by a federal court of
appeals. The court concluded that it did not posses the authority to
override Congress' policy decisions when the statutory language was clear.
Therefore, the court held that Carney's appeal was untimely.
One judge dissented to the majority's opinion. This dissent contended
that nothing required the court to interpret the ALJ's decision as a civil
penalty order as soon as it was dispensed. Even though the Administrator
had delegated ALJs with the authority to issue all necessary orders, that
fact did not force the court to perceive the ALJ's initial decision as a
matured civil penalty order. The dissent reasoned that the CFR language
pertaining to the presiding office's initial decision's development into the
Board's final order within forty-five days after its service upon the parties
without further proceedings buttressed the view that the ALJ's initial

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

decision was not the final agency decision. Criticizing the majority's rigid
construction of the words "final" and "issued," the dissent declared that
Congress could not have intended for such a statutory interpretation. In the
dissent's opinion, the law could have been construed to require a notice of
appeal filing within thirty days following an ALJ's final decision. The
dissent would have held that Carney's appeal was timely.
Sara Franklin
Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the Clean Water Act did not require municipalities to strictly
comply with state water-quality standards when applying for storm water
discharge permits).
In 1992 and 1993, five Arizona cities submitted applications for
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits to
discharge storm water. The permits did not attempt compliance with
Arizona's water-quality standards. Defenders of Wildlife ("Defenders")
objected, arguing that the permits should strictly comply with state
standards. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") required the
cities to implement a Storm Water Management Program, which included
numerous environmental controls, such as storm water detention and
retention basins and infiltration ponds. The program also incorporated a
system to eliminate illegal discharges. After inclusion of these practices,
the EPA determined that the permits complied with state water-quality
standards, and, in February 1997, issued final NPDES permits to the
cities.
The Defenders requested a hearing, raising the legal question of
whether the Clean Water Act ("CWA") required strict numeric limitations
to ensure compliance with state water-quality standards. In June 1997, the
EPA denied the request; the Defenders petitioned for review with the
Environmental Appeals Board ("Board"). The Board also denied the
petition. Thus, the Defenders moved for reconsideration and, upon denial
of this motion, appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Ninth Circuit held that, based upon statutory interpretation and
congressional intent, the CWA did not require municipalities to strictly
comply with state water-quality standards regarding storm water
In reaching this decision, the court utilized a two-step
discharges.
approach to review an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute.
Under the first step, the court used traditional tools of statutory
construction to decide whether Congress had expressed its intent clearly.
If Congress left a gap in the statute for the administrative agency to fill,
then in step two, the court was required to uphold the agency's decision
unless it was "arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute."
The court first noted that the CWA prohibited discharge of any
pollutant into navigable waters. However, an entity could obtain an
NPDES permit, allowing the entity to discharge some pollutants. Under

